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Abstract
Global health financing has increased dramatically in recent years, indicative of a rise in health as a foreign policy
issue. Several governments have issued specific foreign policy statements on global health and a new term, global
health diplomacy, has been coined to describe the processes by which state and non-state actors engage to posi-
tion health issues more prominently in foreign policy decision-making. Their ability to do so is important to advan-
cing international cooperation in health. In this paper we review the arguments for health in foreign policy that
inform global health diplomacy. These are organized into six policy frames: security, development, global public
goods, trade, human rights and ethical/moral reasoning. Each of these frames has implications for how global
health as a foreign policy issue is conceptualized. Differing arguments within and between these policy frames,
while overlapping, can also be contradictory. This raises an important question about which arguments prevail in
actual state decision-making. This question is addressed through an analysis of policy or policy-related documents
and academic literature pertinent to each policy framing with some assessment of policy practice. The reference
point for this analysis is the explicit goal of improving global health equity. This goal has increasing national trac-
tion within national public health discourse and decision-making and, through the Millennium Development Goals
and other multilateral reports and declarations, is entering global health policy discussion. Initial findings support
conventional international relations theory that most states, even when committed to health as a foreign policy
goal, still make decisions primarily on the basis of the ‘high politics’ of national security and economic material
interests. Development, human rights and ethical/moral arguments for global health assistance, the traditional ‘low
politics’ of foreign policy, are present in discourse but do not appear to dominate practice. While political momen-
tum for health as a foreign policy goal persists, the framing of this goal remains a contested issue. The analysis
offered in this article may prove helpful to those engaged in global health diplomacy or in efforts to have global
governance across a range of sectoral interests pay more attention to health equity impacts.
Introduction
In 2007, the foreign ministers of seven countries issued
the Oslo Declaration identifying global health as ‘a
pressing foreign policy issue of our time’ [1]. The
declaration was not the start of recent interest in health
and foreign policy, but reflects a decadal trend in which
health has become more prominent in global policy
agendas. This prominence has been accompanied by
promotion of a new concept - global health diplomacy
(GHD) - to describe the processes by which govern-
ment, multilateral and civil society actors attempt to
position health in foreign policy negotiations and to cre-
ate new forms of global health governance [2].
This article examines some of the arguments for
GHD. It does not explore GHD per se (the ‘how’ of for-
eign policy deliberations) but several of the rationales
that have been, or could be, used to position global
health better within foreign policy. It seeks both to
review arguments for GHD, assessing some of their
strengths and weaknesses, as well as to suggest addi-
tional arguments. Its intent is to strengthen the base for
those who are attempting to argue for health in a variety
of foreign policy settings. Our analysis was guided by a
template of major global health policy frames based on
an earlier study undertaken by the lead author: security,
development, global public goods, trade, human rights
and ethical/moral reasoning [3]. The selection of these
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frames arose from the lead author’s participation in
international conferences and meetings on, and past
research in, global health, and was refined and elabo-
rated as part of an interdisciplinary research project on
global health ethics. We make no claim that these
frames are the only ones that exist; or that they are the-
oretically or analytically distinct. Rather, they provide
useful heuristics for assessing some of what we (and
others, see [4]) would contend have been the major
arguments advanced for why health should be more
prominent in governments’ foreign policies.
Methods
In this article we address two questions:
1. What arguments have been advanced by govern-
ments to position global health more prominently in
foreign policy deliberations?
2. How does their policy framing relate to their
potential to improve global health equity?
We first examined major English-language health and
foreign policy statements issued from the early 2000s
until 2009 (see Table 1) [1,5-13]. These statements were
selected through information provided by a new World
Health Organization program of work on global health
diplomacy; participation in meetings and events on glo-
bal health diplomacy; report bibliographies; and key
word searches using Google and Google-scholar. As this
was a search for government or multilateral statements
on health and foreign policy academic database searches
were not undertaken. Not all of these documents we
reviewed carry the same political weight. Some are Cabi-
net-level policies or legislated requirements; others are
national strategies arising from a specific sector, norma-
tive declarations, or simply commentaries by global
Table 1 Health and Foreign Policy Key Documents
Title (Abbreviated) Country, Year Comment, Source
Swiss Health Foreign Policy: Agreement on
Health Foreign Policy Objectives * [5]
(FDHA)
Switzerland, 2006 Published by Federal Office of Public Health and Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs
Health is Global: a UK Government Strategy *
[6,7]
(UKHG) and (UKHG Annex)
UK, 2008 Issued by the Department of Health
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Departmental Strategic Objectives 2008/09 -
2010/11 # [8]
(UKDSO)
UK, 2008 Issued by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
The National Security Strategy of the United
Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world #
[9]
(UKFP)
UK, 2008 Issued by the Cabinet Office
Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global
Development # [10]
(SW)
Sweden, 2003 Legislation requiring annual report to parliament on how all
foreign policies worked towards goal of global development
(including health)
Oslo Ministerial Declaration–Global Health: A
Pressing Foreign Policy Issue of Our Time § [1]
(OSLO)
Norway, France, Brazil, Indonesia,
Senegal, South Africa and
Thailand, 2007
Statement issued by foreign ministers
Meeting global challenges: international
cooperation in the national interest. † [11]
(SW-GPG)
Sweden, 2006 Issued by the International Task Force on Global Public Goods,
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Coherent for Development? How coherent
Norwegian policies can assist development in
poor countries † [12]
(PCC)
Norway, 2008 Report of a two-year all party commission,
Official Norwegian Reports
Foreign policy and global health: Six national
strategies ‡ [13]
(WHO-GHD)
World Health Organization FTD draft working paper, forthcoming:
Geneva: World Health Organization.
Report of six countries’ experiences in global health diplomacy
first presented at the Prince Mahidol Awards Conference,
Bangkok, Thailand, January 2009
* Official policy statement on health and foreign policy
# Official policy statement on general global development and foreign policy
§ Intergovernmental joint consensus statement
† Advisory commission reports
‡ Commentaries by government officials engaged in global health diplomacy
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health diplomats working within particular governments.
Our intent was not to locate the forcefulness of these
texts within particular government settings. Our interest
was in how these documents described the different
rationales for health as a foreign policy goal, and the
degree to which coherence (or lack thereof) existed
amongst the arguments offered. The approach was
deductive using the six policy frames described earlier
as a template for textual assessment. The texts were
approached as interview transcripts. They were read and
re-read several times, with analytical notes made con-
cerning the arguments or rationales encountered. Key
word searches of the documents using a variety of terms
associated with the six frames were also undertaken,
with careful reading of the text surrounding such terms
in order to ensure our use of the excerpts cited in this
paper are in context.
We also undertook a non-systematic but rigorous
review of recent academic literature related to each pol-
icy framing to assess the empirical or theoretical basis
for differing rationales. These rationales were then
examined for their actual or potential effects on global
health equity. Health equity is generally defined as an
absence of systematic and remediable differences
between population groups [14], that are not freely cho-
sen and which may be considered unfair or unjust [15].
While this is only one of several goals that could have
been selected, it is logically implicit in health as a for-
eign policy concern; and is a concept with widespread
traction in national public health practice, research and
scholarship. It has also been elevated to a global level in
part through the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) and the work of the recent World Health Orga-
nization Commission on Social Determinants of Health
[16]. Our own use of this concept (global health equity)
does not necessarily mean reductions in health inequal-
ities, although that would be a likely effect. Instead, and
following from the work of cosmopolitan theorists that
emphasize the importance of “capabilities” for health
rather than measurable health status itself [17-20], we
refer to reductions in inequalities in the resources peo-
ple need to make choices concerning their health.
1. Health and Security
Security, alongside development, is the most frequently
encountered frame in the documents we reviewed,
with the securitization of health now claimed to be ‘a
permanent feature of public health governance in the
21st century’[21]. Although ‘health security’ is recent in
coinage, its history dates back at least to the 14th cen-
tury when epidemics threatened to destabilize sover-
eign power and to compromise the material interests
of elite groups. The response to this threat often
strengthened the power of states over civil society even
as it undermined citizen trust in state institutions [22],
a concern that now extends to inter-state relations and
who gains most through collaborative efforts to control
pandemics [23]. The principle contemporary argu-
ments pertain to national and economic security (key
arguments or rationales within each policy framing are
italicized), echoing the historic concern over the role
disease might play in economic decline and regional
conflict (UKHG, OSLO):
A healthy population is fundamental to prosperity,
security and stability ... In contrast, poor health does
more than damage the economic and political viabi-
lity of any one country - it is a threat to the eco-
nomic and political interests of all countries (UKHG,
p. 7 emphasis added).
Empirically, evidence of the link between conflict and
disease remains robust [22] although the reverse relation
is still equivocal [24,25]. Findings that disease leads to
conflict are based primarily on correlations between
infant/maternal mortality and the likelihood of failed
states in African partial democracies; and between the
prevalence of HIV/AIDS and civil conflict [26,27]. The
latter finding corroborates historical evidence that it is
the novelty and lethality of pathogens that disrupt socie-
ties and threaten political power, rather than disease
prevalence per se. The existing wealth and stability of
state institutions can moderate these effects [22], and
not all analysts are convinced that the link between
HIV/AIDS and state instability is as strong as has been
argued [23]. At the same time, unchecked contagion
within borders has been argued to engender social
‘chaos’ leading to increased identity-based (ethnic/class)
conflicts while decreasing productivity and prosperity
upon which social harmony is in part based [22]. Thus,
while contested, health security concerns with disease
and conflict are not unfounded.
The rationale for intervening in epidemics in foreign
states follows three main logics. First, epidemic-asso-
ciated national conflicts could become regional. Con-
temporary evidence of epidemics leading to inter-state
(as distinct from intra-state) conflict is weak [22]; how-
ever, disease-amplified shifts in regional balances of
power could affect foreign economic interests. Second,
epidemic-associated poverty could abet a growth in ter-
rorist activities and thus threaten national security. Pov-
erty, either as a cause or an effect of epidemic disease, is
not associated with terrorism per se, but impoverished
regions of poorer countries have been argued to afford
sympathetic (or coerced) havens for terrorist groups
(UKFP), for which there is some empirical evidence
[28]. Third, epidemic-associated national or regional
conflicts can create peace-keeping costs to other
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countries, threaten citizens and military abroad and
(even without conflicts) dampen economic growth and
increase poverty, reducing potential markets for other
countries’ exports (threats to economic security), all
points argued by the US National Intelligence Council
in 2000 [29] and reaffirmed in the 2010 Obama Admin-
istration’s National Security Strategy [30].
Three other security rationales were offered in the
documents we reviewed. The first, conflict prevention,
regards health as a means to prevent recurring conflict
when rebuilding failed states or reconstructing after dis-
asters (FDHA, UKHG, OSLO). This argument is similar
to the older concept of “health as a bridge for peace,”
which emphasized the role of health interventions (such
as vaccinations or humanitarian emergency care) as a
way of reducing conflict and promoting peace; however,
evidence for sustained peace resulting from health inter-
ventions is weak [23]. At issue remains the extent to
which health interventions, during or post-conflict, are
designed to promote the conditions for peace or are pri-
marily a means to gain the support of non-combatant
populations caught in the middle of conflicts [22]. Inter-
national humanitarian law provides a second argument
(UKHG, PCC). It lays out the rules for the conduct of
hostilities and, with it, obligations on states for certain
forms of protection to non-combatants. Reference here
is made to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions,
in which Norway is claimed to have played a prominent
role [31]. The UK policy commits to the ratification of
this Convention and further calls for a legally binding
treaty for the international trade in conventional arms
without impinging upon ‘legitimate, responsible defence
exports’ (UKHG, p. 21). This global health goal is reiter-
ated in the UK’s overall foreign policy initiative
(UKDSO), but what remains problematic is the meaning
of ‘legitimate, responsible defence exports.’ The UK is
one of the world’s largest arms exporters and has come
under criticism for failing to enforce many of its own
policies including those dealing with corruption or
export to countries where there is risk of arms use to
repress human rights [32]. France, another GHD-
espousing country, similarly scores poorly for the scale
of its arms exports to countries with poor democratic
accountability [33].
The last of the security arguments, fear of disease pan-
demics, recurs most frequently in the documents we
reviewed (FDHA, OSLO, UKHG, WHO-GHD). Epi-
demic-induced fear has vigorous historic precedence,
and is credited with contributing to the chaos and unra-
velling social contracts between states and their citizenry
that characterized early 19th century Europe [22]. SARS
and persisting concern over pandemic influenza are the
contemporary flashpoints. Thailand and the UK both
credit SARS with initiating their efforts in global health
policy, and their adoption of the (revised) International
Health Regulations. Efforts against such threats or risks
are described as ‘national health security,’ a variation of
a government’s overall obligation to defend ‘the state
from external attack’ (OSLO). But national health secur-
ity is no longer a matter of one state or government
alone; it has become inherently global, the common
argument being that ‘global health security is only as
strong as its weakest link’ which must be strengthened
through ‘global mechanisms and other measures that
enable countries to make an informed and coordinated
response’ (OSLO). Global health security is evocative of
the older concept of collective security, which describes
international (and often legal) agreements amongst
states to protect themselves against the actions of other
states [34,35]. The UN system, notably through its
Security Council, is emblematic of collective security
insofar as the security of member states is presumed to
require a high and somewhat binding level of interna-
tional cooperation. Global health security pitches itself
in a similar fashion, insofar as it emphasizes the interde-
pendency of health risks across nations. Global health
security, however, cannot yet be considered truly collec-
tive given the small number of nations that have so far
committed to it; the concept of a ‘concert’ of like-
minded nations fits better.
Global Health Equity Concerns
International relations theory generally ranks foreign
policy goals in a hierarchy of descending importance
from national and economic security (material interests/
high politics) to development concerns and human dig-
nity/humanitarian aid (normative values/low politics).
The assumption is that high politics framing is more
likely to lead diplomacy and policy decision-making
than low politics framing [36]. But what happens when
the high politics of national security and economic
interests collide with the low politics of global develop-
ment and humanitarian aid? It may be possible to argue
national security interests for most health aid, at least
over the long-term [22], but this risks rendering the
concept of national security imprecise if not meaningless
[24]. Since narrowly-construed domestic interests
already trump those of longer-term global health need
[37], aligning global health with high politics could
triage assistance even further away from need. As one
indication: the securitization of health disproportionately
directs funding and attention to those ills deemed politi-
cally to be national security risks. Funding for HIV/
AIDS (twice cited by the UN Security Council as a
threat to security) and for pandemic influenza (relative
to global burden of disease) are the present exemplars;
they are also the only two issues to which France has
attached ‘thematic ambassadors’ working between its
Ministries of Health and of European and Foreign
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Affairs (WHO-GHD). Historically, national self-interest
(security) has failed to motivate sustained commitment
to international health cooperation [24], a point noted
by some policy statements (e.g. OSLO). The securitiza-
tion of health also pushes responses away from an ethos
of altruism to one of self-interest, and from civil society
to intelligence organizations, potentially triaging inter-
vention on the basis of individuals’ rank within military,
political or economic hierarchies [38]. Its focus on infec-
tious disease reflects more the interests of wealthier
countries (with a present low burden) than of poorer
countries with existing high burdens; at least to the
extent that interventions are based more on outbreak
containment than outbreak prevention [39]. While the
newer concept of global health security could confront
these limitations, its embrace of a ‘weakest link’ argu-
ment still privileges risks to others and not to those
who may be the cauldrons of that risk. Curiously, little
mention can be found in policy statements of human
security. In contrast to national security, human security
focuses on the protection of ‘the vital core of all human
lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human
fulfilment’ [40,41]. Human security is people- rather
than state-centred, with emphasis on vulnerable popula-
tions. While no longer as fashionable in foreign policy
circles as it was in the late 1990s, positioning security in
human terms places foreign policy consideration into a
larger set of international responsibilities, creating an
argumentative path into other global health policy
frames.
2. Health and Development
The most prominent of these other frames is develop-
ment. Health has long been one of the desired outcomes
of development with recent studies affirming that state
investments in health and education have been impor-
tant in explaining why some countries have experienced
rapid economic growth, while others have not [42,43].
These findings reverse conventional wisdom: health is
no longer simply a consequence of growth, but one of
its engines. This argument is posited as one of the
major reasons for advancing health in foreign policy
(OSLO, UKHG). As Norway’s foreign minister noted in
tacit acknowledgement of where global power lies (mar-
kets, and those who dominate them):
We need to find new ways of portraying health
expenditures as more than costs, but also as an
investment. [W]e need to. .... get to the core of the
economic dimension and speak a language that peo-
ple with power really understand [44].
Based on the documents we reviewed, two rationales
for health as development dominate: aid for economic
return and aid for strategic (security, resource) purposes.
Both rationales would see development investments allo-
cated by donor self-interest which may (or may not)
reflect global health need. The investment argument for
global health development (traditionally a low politics
concern) overlaps with the high politics arguments of
national security. As the UK policy comments, ‘improv-
ing global health is vital if we are to achieve the Govern-
ment’s domestic and international objectives,’ which
hints at national security issues (UKHG). More expli-
citly, the UK policy is expected to cohere with that
country’s ‘first’ National Security Strategy, the opening
statement of which - is clear: ‘Providing security for the
nation and for its citizens remains the most important
responsibility of government’ (UKFP, p. 3). Pandemics
are lumped together with ‘international terrorism, weap-
ons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states...and
trans-national crime’ as the modern threats to security,
actions on which are justified in relation to the ‘most
important responsibility of government’ -protection of
British citizens. This justification may explain why non-
communicable diseases rank low in aid and develop-
ment discourse, and are completely absent from the
MDGs. Chronic diseases pose less risk to national or
global (trans-border) health security than do infectious
pandemics. This creates incoherence within UK policy:
to promote health equity, which is normative and free
of condition (UKHG), and the constrained logic of
security with its first priority to what will protect British
citizens (UKFP).
Yet there is also normative and ethical reasoning
underpinning (at least some) development intentions
and investments. Norway has highlighted the impor-
tance of assistance to countries to reach MDG 4 (reduce
child mortality by two-thirds) and MDG 5 (reduce
maternal mortality by three-quarters) (WHO-GHD), tar-
gets unlikely in the short term to benefit high-income
countries either in terms of new markets or reduced
national (pandemic) security risk. The Oslo Declaration
similarly was specific that donors must ‘push develop-
ment cooperation models that match domestic commit-
ment and reflect the requirements of those in need and
not one that is characterised by charity and donors’
national interests’ (OSLO, p. 1373-1378 emphasis
added). It remains moot the extent to which such state-
ments give rise to actual aid policy change.
The Oslo Declaration states the need to ‘honour exist-
ing financial commitments’ and it is here that actions
for many countries have lagged well behind proclaimed
intent (and this before the global financial crisis began
to threaten future aid disbursements). Neither is it clear
whether a country’s official policy commitment to global
health necessarily equates to an increased volume of
health aid. The Swiss government policy emphasizes
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improving ‘the efficiency of multilateral players in the
fields of health, development cooperation and humani-
tarian aid,’ but not aid volumes noting that ‘no addi-
tional human or financial resources are planned for the
implementation of this agreement’ (FDHA, emphasis
added). This undermines at least one component of its
policy’s stated objective, notably ‘to strengthen the glo-
bal partnership for development, security and human
rights, making a credible and acknowledged contribu-
tion’ (FDHA). Its major development contribution is
cited as support to the Global Fund (WHO-GHD), but
this support compares poorly to other countries claim-
ing alignment with the ‘health is global’ concept [45,46].
The International Health Partnership+ (IHP+), as one
example of a development approach to global health
policy anticipated by the Oslo Declaration, similarly
remains equivocal over whether it will deliver more
health aid or only improve the efficiency and effective-
ness of what is currently on offer. Launched in Septem-
ber 2007, with leadership from the UK and Norway, the
IHP+ intends to operationalize the Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness within the health sector. The Paris
Declaration emphasizes the ‘harmonization’ of activities
by donors and external agencies, a response to the
growth in bilateral health aid and independent global
health initiatives that is weakening recipient countries’
capacities to develop their own comprehensive health
system plans. Harmonization, as the UK policy explains,
should lead to ‘international development agencies pool-
ing a greater proportion of their money to finance
directly the budgets of health sector plans in developing
countries’ (UKHG). Alongside harmonization is ‘coun-
try-ownership’ of health plans, the ‘alignment’ of exter-
nal assistance to country priorities, and sustained and
predictable donor funding. While still in its infancy, the
IHP+’s first Ministerial Review in February 2009 empha-
sized aid effectiveness over aid volume [47]. Its first
independently managed progress report (February 2010)
showed slow progress and a lack of compliance with
reporting accountability by most of its bilateral donors.
While all documents reviewed stressed the importance
of aid, some were critical of its overemphasis reflecting
renewed critiques of aid-dependency and failure (at least
in the case of the African continent) to lead to sustained
economic growth and development [48]. As Norway’s
Policy Coherence Commission reported:
The aim here is not fighting poverty through
increasing aid or loans to poor people or countries,
but framework conditions that can make it easier for
these countries to create long-term economic growth
and reduce poverty themselves.... Aid can be a cru-
cial and necessary catalyst for contributing to
development, but it is far from adequate as a tool to
make this sustainable (PCC, p23).
As one of several instances of these ‘framework condi-
tions’ the Commission assessed Norway’s foreign direct
investment strategy. It found that very little of Norway’s
foreign investment goes to Africa and much of what
does is in oil production, which so far has failed to
develop African economies. Even so, the small amount
of such investment is greater than the (comparatively
generous) amount of aid that Norway provides to Africa,
‘which illustrates how marginal the scope of the aid is in
relation to other resource flows to developing countries’
(PCC, p. 27). The Commission recommended that Nor-
way’s large ‘Government Pension Fund - Global’ be used
more strategically for investments that benefit primarily
the poor; that a large fund be created for investments in
Africa and least developed countries; and that emphasis
in both should be on environmentally sustainable forms
of economic growth and development. These recom-
mendations were further qualified by reference to for-
eign direct investment yielding its greatest development
potential through transfer of new technologies and man-
agerial skills; improved social, environmental, gender
equality and labour standards; provision of decent
employment; inter-linkages with the local economy; and
payment of taxes and royalties that contribute to domes-
tic development financing. There were dissenting opi-
nions to these recommendations amongst Commission
members; and the Commission, while all-party, was
advisory only and does not reflect Norwegian foreign
policy. Nonetheless, these recommendations show the
potential breadth of engagement in policy coherence for
development in which improved health equity is consid-
ered an integral component.
Global Health Equity Concerns
If one accepts donor governments’ endorsement of the
MDGs and the ‘weakest link’ global health security argu-
ment, aid in general and health aid in particular should
be allocated by global health need. The 2007 OECD-
DAC Report did find that ‘the “poverty-efficiency” of
ODA,’ the amount disbursed by poverty need, ‘is conti-
nuing to increase’ [[45], p.20], poverty being the major
risk condition for high disease burdens. The baseline for
ODA poverty-efficiency, however, is very low; and cur-
rent development practice, while improving for health
more than for other sectors, remains driven by foreign
policy objectives largely removed from demonstrable
need [23]. Efforts to bypass the partisanship of bilateral
aid have seen a recent and dramatic rise of disease-spe-
cific global public-private partnerships in health, now
numbering over ninety [49]. This growth has been
defended on the basis that ‘fighting against diseases
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(especially contagious diseases) is a global public good’
(our next policy frame) and the existence of ‘reasonable
doubts about the levels of efficiency and effectiveness of
traditional aid channels’ [[50], p.11]. At the same time,
this proliferation in such initiatives compounds the frag-
mentation problem and increasing transaction costs of
health development assistance. Issues in global financing
for health are long-standing and well-argued elsewhere
[51]. We will not enter these debates in this article apart
from noting three key points. First, recent reviews sug-
gest that health aid has played an important part in
improving outcomes in many recipient countries, parti-
cularly when it is additional to increased domestic
spending on health [52]. It also slows the out-migration
of health workers in severely under-resourced nations
by creating conditions more favourable to their reten-
tion [53]. Second, the argument that Africa’s inability to
develop despite receiving approximately USD 1 trillion
in aid transfers over the past 40 years, the basis of most
critiques of aid ineffectiveness, is undercut by studies
finding that almost double that amount in capital flight
left the continent over the same period [54]. Much of
this financial impoverishment was the result of multina-
tional tax avoidance aided by the persistence of offshore
financial centres based in, or under the protectorate of,
high-income donor countries. This is one indication of
foreign policy incoherence on a grand scale. Third,
development financing has become increasingly framed
by reference to performance-, results- or outcome-based
criteria. The argument for results is in line with the
GHD concern that aid must be shown to ‘work’ in order
to ‘retain the support of taxpayers’ (WHO-GHD). If
genuinely involving ‘country-ownership’ in criteria defi-
nition [55] such measures can allow for a better assess-
ment of aid effectiveness and avoid problems of
fungibility, where donor funding allows diversion of
public revenues into other forms of spending of less
developmental value. Carried to an extreme, however,
results-based requirements would favour projects with
short-term deliverables at the expense of long-term
infrastructure, or those countries with greater existing
capacities to show returns at the expense of more vul-
nerable states.
3. Health and Global Public Goods
The concept of global public goods (GPG) offers one of
the potentially strongest arguments for GHD. A public
good has two features: Its use is open to all, and does
not diminish through use by others [3]. There is no
consensus on the boundaries demarcating a ‘global’ pub-
lic good or its corollary, a global public bad; but by nar-
row economic definition ‘there are only a few “pure”
global public goods...peace and security, protection
against and prevention of the spread of epidemics,
financial stability and fundamental human rights, a
stable climate, free access to knowledge, opportunities
to travel freely and globally agreed rules on trade and
investment, all have characteristics of such goods’ (PCC
p. 23). Public goods classically arise from market failures
due to free-riding, where those not paying for the good
nonetheless benefit from its presence thereby leading to
its undersupply; and from externalities arising from
market transactions that create a public bad, such as
pollution. These failures are only overcome by public
provision or regulation as a form of collectivization of
both costs and benefits.
The term ‘global public good’ was infrequently cited in
the documents we reviewed, the exceptions being the
PCC and the SW-GPG, both of which were not official
government policy statements. However, frequent refer-
ence to a number of GPGs was made in all of the docu-
ments suggesting implicit acceptance of the concept.
The one most cited was prevention of pandemics, with
the role of the International Health Regulations (IHR),
and its reporting obligations on nations, as an exemplary
global public good (FDHA, OSLO, UKHG, WHO-
GHD); although the Swiss policy justifies its IHR ratifi-
cation by reference to the need to protect ‘the health
interests of the Swiss population’ (FDHA p.14) rather
than to encourage a greater supply of GPGs. In a more
multilateral vein, the UK policy emphasizes the impor-
tance of the IHRs as providing ‘the essential framework
within which the world can better manage its collective
defences against acute public health risks that can
spread internationally and devastate human health,
while avoiding unnecessary interference with interna-
tional traffic and trade’ (UKHG Annex p.24). The refer-
ence to trade has historical meaning; the first
International Sanitary Conference in 1851 took place
against a backdrop of the increased global movement of
goods leading to greater risk of disease pandemics such
as cholera, plague and yellow fever. The merchant class
was sceptical of state quarantine measures, especially if
applied differentially by countries, and pressed for inter-
national cooperation to prevent such risks in a way that
would not affect global trade [56,57]. Where the new
IHRs differ from former reporting requirements is in a
change in diseases for mandatory notification and a
more generic requirement that countries report any
‘extraordinary public health event which constitutes a
public health risk to other States through the interna-
tional spread of disease, and may require a coordinated
international response’ [58]. While there is no enforce-
ment measure for the IHRs, the ability to use non-gov-
ernmental sources of information and the inherent
reciprocal self-interest is presumed to offer sufficient
incentive for compliance. This may overcome free-rid-
ing, but it does not address the ‘weakest link’ problem
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associated with GPGs, in this instance the lack of
resources for pandemic preparedness in many of the
countries that are most likely to be sources of new
pandemics.
That weakened national public health goods can erode
GPGs leads to the argument that provision of assistance
to prevent such epidemics through strengthened public
health systems in low- and middle-income countries is
an essential requirement (SW-GPG). Yet most health
aid presently goes to particular disease programs or to
health care strengthening; very little goes to public
health interventions that create national public goods
(e.g. sanitation, potable water, slum upgrading, disease
surveillance and monitoring, public health regulations).
It was the strengthening of such measures that reduced
communicable disease and improved life expectancy in
industrializing countries in the 19th century, and that is
doing the same in those developing countries today that
are attempting to follow a similar path. There is also
evidence that such national public good/public health
programs are relatively inexpensive, while the economic
savings resulting from the prevention of disease are sub-
stantial [59].
A stable climate is another GPG, the importance of
which is cited in several documents (SW-GPG, OSLO,
PCC, UKHG, WHO-GHD). The UK strategy gives con-
siderable attention to climate change and mitigation
strategies to prevent conflict over natural resources, and
emphasizes using evidence of the health impacts as a
means of motivating more international action on
reduction and mitigation (UKHG). Other statements
(SW, SW-GPG, PCC) generally acknowledge the need
to advance mitigation and adaptation efforts and for
resource transfers from richer to poorer countries to
assist this. Yet evidence of action is less prominent,
partly attributed to richer countries being less affected
by climate change in the short-term, or sufficiently so
for it to become the high politics of national security
(PCC). As of 2009, less than 10 percent of donor
pledges to developing countries to cope with climate
change were disbursed [60]. Neither is it clear if the
recent proliferation of climate change and environmen-
tal funds will be at the expense of other forms of devel-
opment assistance, rather than represent new funding
[61]. Where there is less doubt is the inadequate scale
of the pledges, even assuming they are all kept, leading
to ‘calls to scale-up current finance levels by two orders
of magnitude, from hundreds of millions to tens of bil-
lions a year’ [62].
Regulating health-damaging products also fits within
the definition of a GPG. The adoption of the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2003 is
regarded as one of the most important ventures into
global health regulation by the WHO and one of the
key moments in GHD. The FCTC, however, avoids any
reference to trade, despite strong evidence that trade in
tobacco increases smoking rates [63]. In effect, the most
important global dimension of the tobacco problem dis-
appears in a series of requirements for domestic regula-
tion. While the World Trade Organization has stated its
deferral to the FCTC if a tobacco trade-dispute should
arise amongst members, there remains concern that
provisions in the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellec-
tual Property Rights could be used by tobacco firms to
challenge domestic requirements for warning labels on
cigarette packages. Bilateral investment treaties, which
permit corporations to directly sue national govern-
ments over alleged treaty violations, pose a more serious
challenge. In early 2010, the tobacco multinational, Phi-
lip Morris, launched a suit against the government of
Uruguay over its aggressive warning label requirements,
claiming it infringed the intellectual property right of
their trademark logos protected under a bilateral invest-
ment treaty between Uruguay and Switzerland [64,65].
Another limitation of the FCTC is that it lacks enforce-
ment measures for countries that fail to abide by its
protocols. The potential force of the convention’s
reporting requirements and their use by civil society
organizations (CSOs) have nonetheless engendered calls
for similar conventions on alcohol and its global trade
[66,67] and on the globalization of food commodity
chains creating obesogenic environments [68].
Global Health Equity Concerns
A major equity concern with GPGs is that the govern-
ance frameworks for such goods, such as the IHRs and
the FCTC, are potentially weakened by their ‘soft’ law
status. To some engaged in GHD, this ‘soft’ law is an
advantage, providing greater flexibility for advancing
health concerns in foreign policy negotiations without
having to continually check with political decision-
makers over what might become binding treaties: ‘[I]
ncreased use of legal solutions that are not binding,
such as “codes,” as opposed to formal agreements, will
allow progress to be made more rapidly, and with
greater emphasis on consensus than would be the case
if conventional treaties were prepared’(WHO-GHD).
The potential conflict between such codes and the
‘hard’ law of trade treaties (the next policy frame we
consider) questions such an assessment. An example of
hard law/soft law conflict exists in the issue of transpar-
ent information sharing (essential to the IHRs), intellec-
tual property rights and the power differentials between
high-income and low-/middle-income countries. While
not formally part of the IHRs, countries worldwide have
been collaborating with the WHO in sharing viral sam-
ples as part of a process to prepare for a future pan-
demic influenza. In 2007 Indonesia, a potential epicentre
of any future pandemic, stopped sharing viral samples
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with the WHO because they were being used by labora-
tories to create patented drugs the country could not
afford to purchase. WHO agreed to revise the terms of
reference for collaborating laboratories to which such
samples were sent. But WHO-hosted intergovernmental
negotiations have so far failed to reconcile developing
country interests in benefits-sharing with developed
country demands to retain intellectual property rights
over eventual vaccine discoveries [69], an instance
where private economic interests (economic security)
and its ‘hard’ law trade treaty protection will almost cer-
tainly impede the provision of GPGs and their ‘soft’ law
codes of practice. Even the emergence of pandemic
H1N1 (when concerns over its virulence were still high)
failed to break this deadlock [70]. Thailand has been
particularly critical on this account:
Many developing countries... have proposed that
companies or research institutions should not be
allowed to lay intellectual property claims on pro-
ducts derived from shared biological specimens...It
will take a lot of work and diplomacy to show that it
makes more sense to defend public goods instead of
private interests... but the costs in human terms
associated with collective health insecurity clearly
outweigh any gains or considerations in protecting
intellectual property (WHO-GHD).
Perhaps because it was advisory to government in a
policy decision-making role, the Norwegian Policy
Coherence Commission was straightforward on the
issue of the unequal global power relations that preclude
effective use or protection of global public goods in its
plea for a more egalitarian approach to foreign policy
coherence:
Power is systematically unevenly distributed between
countries, and makes some countries dependent on
framework conditions set by others. The latitude for
action afforded to developing countries is, therefore,
often extremely limited... Acknowledgement that
conflicts of interest exist between rich and poor
countries is required, as is a willingness to consider
aspects other than Norwegian interests, and to give
up privileges that rich countries currently have in a
number of areas. Such changes can be painful to
carry through in policy areas that apply to national
interests...Nevertheless, there is no excuse for not
changing a policy that thwarts development in poor
countries (PCC, pp.21-22; emphasis added).
4. Health and Trade
Power differentials are most apparent where global
health intersects with global trade. A rules-based trading
system is considered to be a global public good for the
decline in economic growth (a global public ‘bad’) that
it is presumed to avoid. Generally, all policies and
reports we reviewed favour an open global trading sys-
tem as one that would ‘support global health security’
(OSLO). The UK further emphasized the need for such
a trading system to be ‘stronger, freer and fairer’
(UKHG, p. 58). Other statements, however, were less
sanguine on how ‘free’ or ‘fair’ a global trading system
might be, citing continued protectionism by wealthier
countries (SW-GPG) or inequalities in the power to
negotiate equitable terms (PCC). Largely absent was any
consideration of the role increased global trade and tra-
vel has on the risk of pandemics, despite the long his-
tory of pathogens and pestilence following trade routes
and the expert concern, expressed several years before
the birth of the World Trade Organization (WTO), that
global trade is a major potential source of emerging
infections [71]. Liberalization of food trade, and the eco-
nomic incentives it creates for large scale (overcrowded)
animal production and food processing, are particular
worries [71].
Aside from sanitary considerations, the most impor-
tant trade and health argument follows a standard eco-
nomic logic: trade liberalization increases growth and
development, which reduces poverty, which leads to
improved health that in turn improves growth. The evi-
dence base for this logic, however, is weak. While
most econometric studies find that liberalization on
average is associated with growth, this positive rela-
tionship ‘is neither automatically guaranteed nor uni-
versally observable’ [72]. Moreover, poverty reduction
during globalization’s peak decades of liberalized trade,
during which global economic growth quadrupled, has
been modest at best, leading one senior World Bank
development economist to conclude that “it is hard to
maintain the view that expanding external trade is...a
powerful force for poverty reduction in developing
countries” [73]; while there is robust empirical consen-
sus that trade liberalization leads to inequalities in
labour markets, as wages for highly skilled workers in
globally competitive industries rise and those for lesser
skilled workers in relative abundance fall [74]. This is
not to argue that trade liberalization is necessarily bad
for health; rather, there is evidence and argument that
the pacing of such liberalization, alongside the provi-
sion of social safety nets and flexibilities that account
for countries’ different development levels and produc-
tive capacities, can help to offset the dislocations in
domestic labour markets that inevitably follow open-
ness to global competition [75,76]. These findings sug-
gest a careful nuance of any automatic claims of
liberalization’s health beneficence within foreign policy
considerations.
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Intellectual property rights (IRPs) have generated the
greatest health and trade controversy and the most dis-
cussion within the documents we reviewed. Arguments
from high-income countries where IPRs have greater
economic importance emphasize a balance between
ensuring access to medicines in low- and middle-income
countries and maintaining sufficient pharmaceutical
profitability to stimulate new research: ‘Switzerland,
with its major pharmaceutical industry and long huma-
nitarian tradition, is committed both to adequate protec-
tion of intellectual property as well as access to essential
drugs for the world’s poorest countries’ (FDHA, p. 13),
arguing that ‘appropriate protection for intellectual
property [is] an essential incentive for research into, and
development of new drugs and vaccines’ (FDHA, p. 15).
The same rationale is found in the UK policy which
affirms ‘the right of developing countries to use the flex-
ibilities built into the Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, such as the judicious use of
compulsory licensing’ but adds that ‘this should not be
at the expense of damaging incentives to invest in
research and development’ (UKHG, p. 28). The 2001
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health to which
the UK policy refers, however, makes no mention of
‘judicious’ use of its provisions nor the need to ‘balance’
use of these flexibilities with incentives to pharmaceuti-
cal company research.
Health services are also tradable commodities under
WTO and some regional and bilateral agreements. Only
the UK policy discusses health services trade, couching
its economic interests as one of mutual benefits arising
‘from the opportunities that come through freer and
fairer global trade in health services and commodities’
(UKHG, p. 9). It specifically targets the health sector in
India, China and Brazil for its commercial health ser-
vices and products. Yet the role of private sector invol-
vement in health services in improving health equity
remains ideologically and empirically contested, with the
weight of evidence highly critical of unregulated private
markets [77]. The UK commitment to increase trade in
health services appears to conflict with other of its pol-
icy statements concerning the depth of medical poverty
created by private health care; and commitments to
strengthen through its development assistance public
health systems in poorer countries.
Poorly regulated global capital flows pose substantial
health risks, likely much greater than liberalized trade in
goods [78-80]. Portfolio investment (essentially trade in
currencies) dwarfs all other forms of capital flows. Such
speculative capital flows are subject to panics, manias
and crashes [81] with devastating effects on health
through depreciation of national currencies and pur-
chasing power [82,83], the most recent (and still
ongoing) global financial crisis being a case in point.
Subsequent austerity measures reduce public revenues
or expenditures on health and social program transfers
[84-86]. The UK policy is alone in referencing ‘global
financial turbulence’, for which it calls for non-specific
reforms of the IMF (UKHG Annex, p.49). Given that it
is the most recently released statement on global health
policy that we reviewed, the silence on this issue attests
to the general lack of national regulatory oversight of
financial markets until their rapid collapse in 2008.
Global Health Equity Concerns
In terms of indirect health effects (the health external-
ities of increased global economic integration) trade lib-
eralization may be associated with greater growth and
poverty reduction, but the relationship is dependent on
pre-existing development conditions and public policies
that vary by country. Increases in economic insecurity
and labour market losses resulting from liberalization
may be offset by stronger social protection measures,
but these are less affordable if developing countries are
required to reduce tariffs before implementing broader
and more equitable forms of capturing tax revenues
[52]. While developing countries under WTO rules have
been granted ‘less than full reciprocation’ in their tariff-
reduction schedules, present negotiations for increased
‘non-agricultural market access’ (NAMA negotiations)
could result in annual net tariff losses for developing
countries of USD 63 billion, but losses of only USD 38
billion for developed countries [87,88]. The Norwegian
Policy Coherence Commission was strongest in expres-
sing concerns over the trade/health relationship. It
argued that a clear conflict existed between its country’s
foreign policy goal to take an ‘offensive interest in the
NAMA negotiations’ and its ‘expressed policy to support
developing countries’ requirements and help preserve
their policy space’ (PCC, p.47). It further noted that a
coherent trade and development policy demands ‘asym-
metrical agreements’ disproportionately benefiting devel-
oping countries. At present, such agreements
asymmetrically favour developed nations. Notwithstand-
ing the economic gains of certain Asian and Latin
American developing countries over the past decade,
estimates of aggregate gains from a completed WTO
Doha Development Round under the ‘most realistic sce-
nario’ show developed countries by 2015 gaining USD
80 billion while developing countries would gain only
USD 16 billion [55].
Countries’ economic interests in trade are also in con-
flict with more direct pathways affecting health, notably
with respect to IPRs and health services. The rationale
that extended IPRs are essential to finance research and
development for new drugs, especially for neglected dis-
eases, is weak; while extended IPRs are known to reduce
access to essential medicines in many countries now
subject to their provision in trade treaties [89]. Similarly,
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growth in health services trade can bring economic ben-
efits to certain sectors of the economy, but it can also
lead to inequities in access to both providers and ser-
vices by those unable to pay [66]. More at issue than
health services trade itself is the extent to which inter-
national commercial exchange becomes written into
binding trade treaties such as the General Agreement
on Trade in Services that preclude governments from
changing their minds in the future, at least in any cost-
free way. This led Norway’s Policy Coherence Commis-
sion to conclude that health (as well as water and
education, two key social determinants of health) ‘not
be sectors that are subject to the GATS regulations, but
be protected with a view to future generations’ possibili-
ties for regulating these basic services for the good of
the population’ (PCC, p. 54).
If global health equity is to be more central to the
outcomes of trade, wealthier and more powerful coun-
tries need to accord greater trade policy flexibilities to
poorer developing nations. The essential rationale is that
‘trade is an instrument, not a goal in itself’ (PCC, p. 45),
a point underscored by Brazilian and Thai officials
engaged in global health diplomacy (WHO-GHD).
Human rights are sometimes argued as contrasting
international obligations to trade treaties (WHO-GHD),
yet human rights, much less specific health rights, have
so far been absent in trade negotiations and missing
completely in rulings on disputes [90].
5. Health and Human Rights
The importance of human rights was underscored in all
of the documents we reviewed, including reference to
health as ‘a fundamental right of every human being’
and, in line with legal scholarship, that ‘life is the most
fundamental of human rights, and that life and health
are the most precious assets’ (OSLO). France cites its
support of EU policies on ‘health as a fundamental
human right’ and gives as an example its efforts with
UNAIDS to eliminate travel or entry restrictions on per-
sons who are HIV-positive (WHO-GHD). The UK pol-
icy commits to including health as a section in its
government’s annual human rights report (UKHG
Annex, p.2), claims to champion the rights of women
with particular reference to HIV treatment and services
access (UKHG Annex, p.28) and sexual/reproductive
rights (UKHG, p.42), and cautions that unfair or unethi-
cal trade can deprive workers of their ‘rights to security
of employment and compensation’ (UKHG, p.60);
although how strongly this last sentiment motivates UK
diplomacy in trade negotiations remains open to empiri-
cal scrutiny. Thailand claims that the right to health was
the driving force behind its global health diplomacy
efforts while Brazil finds that having the right to health
in its federal constitution provides a strong base for
arguing health in foreign policy agendas (WHO-GHD).
The Swiss Health Foreign Policy states that ‘one of its
main objectives is to strengthen the global partnership
for development, security and human rights that has
been agreed upon and implemented in the context of
the UN (FDHA, p.12),’ although its position on IPRs is
contrary to that espoused by human rights experts. Swe-
den’s 2003 legislated Policy for Global Development
references specific rights issues throughout, while Nor-
way’s Commission report devotes considerable attention
to a human rights framing of its country’s foreign
policies.
Despite these frequent invocations to human rights,
and apart from the Swedish and Norwegian documents,
little specific reference is made to the actual interna-
tional human rights framework (IFHR), its covenants
and state-parties’ obligations, and its reporting require-
ments. Central to global health in the IFHR is the right
to health, technically known as the Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health.
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) obligates states to
ensure equitable access to a minimum set of health ser-
vices, while General Comment 14 (GC 14) identifies a
broader range of actions required for the progressive
realization of this right [91]. GC 14 further states that
‘collective rights are critical in the field of health’ [91]
implying a need to counter-balance individual entitle-
ments, although there is no clear guidance on when an
individual health right claim might compromise a collec-
tive health right claim [92].
The right to development further implies that rights
are collective rather than simply individual in entitle-
ment. Adopted by the UN in 1986, the Declaration on
the Right to Development contains several articles that
place stringent obligations on states parties to ensure
greater equality of opportunity and equity in outcome
[93]. Some legal scholars believe that this right may
actually entitle poorer countries (through their state) to
make claims for assistance from higher-income nations
[94]. As a Declaration rather than a Treaty, the right is
non-binding on states although it has become ‘a focal
point of United Nations human rights activity concern-
ing development and has been reaffirmed as a universal
human right by the international community [95].’ Paul
Hunt, former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to
health, similarly argues that Article 2(1) of the ICESCR
obligates ‘developed States...to provide international
assistance and cooperation to ensure the realization of
economic, social and cultural rights in low-income
countries,’ a normative affirmation of which exists in the
MDGs [96].
Rights-based arguments are not simply about health
or health-care; they extend to well-being and to
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individual capabilities that form a base for individual
and group enjoyment of health that, in turn, forms a
base for the fuller enjoyment of all human rights. Chap-
man [97], an ethicist and human rights scholar, draws
on the work of Nussbaum to argue the priority of some
rights over others. Nussbaum, with Sen, developed a
moral philosophy based on the concept of human cap-
abilities. While Sen argues effectively for the obligations
states have to provide a minimum basket of resources
allowing people to develop their capabilities (and hence
their health) [18], Nussbaum [20] attempts to identify
the contents of that basket. Her list is extensive and
imprecise. But, drawing from the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as the
ICESCR, Chapman maps these capabilities against what
could be considered basic human rights for human cap-
abilities:
1. The inherent right to life (ICCPR, art. 6.1);
2. Components of the right to the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health (ICESCR,
art. 12);
3. Parts of the right to adequate education (ICESCR,
art. 13);
4. The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion (ICCPR, art. 18);
5. The rights to peaceful assembly (ICCPR, art. 21),
freedom of association with others (ICCPR, art. 22),
and the right to take part in the conduct of public
affairs and to vote (ICCPR, art. 25);
6. Equality before the law and the prohibition of dis-
crimination (ICCPR, art. 26).
One could consider this a short list against which any
foreign policy decision should be interrogated before
being agreed upon; and which should inform global
health diplomacy efforts that incorporate both health
and its key social determinants.
Global Health Equity Concerns
One of the greatest challenges in strengthening global
health as a foreign policy concern exists in the opposi-
tion between several provisions of trade treaties and
obligations under human rights covenants. While there
has been no shortage of efforts to position both health
and human rights more strongly in trade debates, health
actually ‘has a much stronger profile in international
trade law than the protection of human rights, which is
not an objective trade treaties recognize as a legitimate
reason for restricting trade’ [98]. This lack of attention
in trade treaties to issues of human rights has been
commented upon at the highest UN levels. The former
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Paul
Hunt, issued several reports noting potential conflicts
between trade and health rights [99], including a priori
advice against agreeing to TRIPS+ provisions in bilateral
treaties in light of human rights obligations to ensure
access to essential medicines [100]. Several UN Special
Rapporteurs have detailed how trade liberalization, as
generally negotiated, can undermine states’ capacities
for the progressive realization of a number of human
rights [97].
While the relationship of human rights covenants to
other treaties, such as trade agreements, is still a central
debate in international law, the primacy of human rights
is supported by legal and scholarly texts. Section 103 of
the Charter of the United Nations, for example, states
that in conflicts between Charter obligations and those
under other international treaties, Charter obligations
will prevail; while the Vienna Declaration and Program
of Action (1993) is widely regarded as a state consensus
on the moral primacy of human rights over other public
interests. One hundred and seventy-one states pro-
claimed the protection and promotion of human rights
and fundamental freedoms as the first responsibility of
governments [101].
The Vienna Declaration sits uncomfortably with the
high politics of national security and economic interests.
It is possible to shoe-horn both security and economics
into several human rights treaty obligations; but it has
also been argued that international law ‘presupposes
that there is a minimum substantive normativity inher-
ent in the international legal order, a kind of foundation
or floor, grounding the aspirations and efforts of the
international legal system’, and that the preservation of
human life and health can be understand to comprise
that floor [[102], p.10]. Human security, or the security
of the person, is not the same as national security. It
implies a different set of policy priorities and diplomacy
approaches than arguments from national security alone.
The principal health equity concern with the rights
frame is that the right to health can be interpreted in
legal decisions as an individual right only. This could
configure health services in response to litigation that
may give rise to inequities in access for others. Evidence
of this is found in countries that have made this right
justiciable within their constitutions, such as Brazil,
where this right has become ‘a strategy of the pharma-
ceutical industry, to take advantage of the large number
of judicial decisions granting individuals a right to
receive expensive medicines this industry produces’
[103]. The cost to the public health systems of financing
such patent medicines may be at the expense of expan-
sion of primary health care services known to dispropor-
tionately benefit the poor. International legal scholars
argue that human rights emphasis should be placed on
poorer and more vulnerable populations. This requires
greater attention to the concept of collective rights,
implied in GC 14 on the right to health and explicit in
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the Declaration on the Right to Development. Finally,
despite evidence of rights-based arguments having legal
weight within countries, and the exercise of such rights
associated with better population health outcomes
across a range of countries [104], there is no formal
mechanism for their enforcement outside of national
jurisprudence. Globally, they remain ‘soft’ law, albeit
representing ‘the most globalized political value of our
times’ [105].
6. Health and Ethical/Moral Reasoning
The legalistic language and problematic individual nat-
ure of human rights has some scholars claiming that
without a more explicit set of ethical principles against
which decisions can be appraised, the high politics of
foreign policy might always override the low politics of
global health. Arguments from values or ethics are rare
in policy discourse [106]. Values may be perceived as
vague or not universal (cultural relativism), a feature of
particularist moral philosophy [107]. However, states,
the people who govern them and the institutions they
create are moral actors not exempt from a capacity for,
and necessity of, ethical justification for their actions.
Explicit reference to values or ethical norms was not
common in the statements we reviewed, but neither was
it absent. The UK Security Strategy claims that it ‘is
clearly grounded in a set of core values’ that ‘include
human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accounta-
ble government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and oppor-
tunity for all’ (UKFP, p. 6) - an ill-defined shopping list.
Sweden’s 2003 policy more restrictively describes ‘the
firm conviction that everybody has a right to a life in
dignity’ as ‘the basis of the solidarity with poor,
oppressed and vulnerable people’ (SW, p. 19).
Health has special importance to an individual’s
experience of security or dignity [19]. The reasoning for
this lies, first, in health as basic to peoples’ enjoyment of
other rights or capabilities; and second, in provision of
resources for health being prone to market failures
requiring collective forms of intervention. These instru-
mental arguments are accompanied by an ‘ethical princi-
ple of human flourishing or human capability’ with roots
in Aristotelian political theory and Sen’s and Nuss-
baum’s capabilities approach [18,20]. Health is both
‘intrinsically and instrumentally valuable’ [[108], p. 430].
But achieving it demands resources for capabilities. This
immediately surfaces questions of social justice in how
fairly (equitably) resources are allocated amongst peo-
ples and, from a global health equity perspective,
countries.
Social justice is argued to be a universal concern, since
all social arrangements to be legitimate and to function
must attend to issues of equity [17], although there are
subtleties in how social justice theory is conceived. Two
main dimensions exist: equality of opportunity, achieved
through procedural justice that treats equals the same;
and equality of outcome, achieved through substantive
justice that treats unequals differently according to their
initial endowments or privileges. Both equalities (oppor-
tunity, outcome) are ideal types; neither exists in ‘true’
form. They represent aspirational ideals of what societies
strive to create for their members (fairness in outcomes)
and how they believe this should be accomplished (fair-
ness in opportunity).
Moral arguments underpinning a superordinance of
procedural over substantive justice have strong roots in
Western theories of liberal individualism, but do not
entirely discount the importance of redistribution.
Smith, in his Wealth of Nations, famously argued for
some form of state intervention to moderate the mar-
ket’s ‘invisible hand’ [109].
More recently, Singer, in a utilitarian vein, posited that
it is both just and of collective benefit to act to relieve
poverty and deprivation if, in doing so, we do not sacri-
fice something of comparable moral significance [110].
Rawls in his influential Theory of Justice argued that
people, standing behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ as to their
social standing at birth, would choose a justice that
guaranteed a minimum of primary goods basic to their
needs; and that inequalities in such goods are allowable
only to the extent that they improve the lot of the least
advantaged compared to what their lives would have
been like without such inequalities. This ‘difference
principle’ obliges minimal interventions of redistribution
and regulation, as well as procedural justice [111].
Rawls’ indifference to matters of escalating inequalities
that could undermine human agency (and hence health)
is one source of criticism of his moral philosophy, as
was his initial exclusion of health care (and by extension
other resources for health) as primary goods.
Rawls’ justice theory is located within the ‘social con-
tract’ school, which views states as the primary actors in
international relations, consistent with dominant inter-
national relations theories and the classic hierarchy of
foreign policy goals. It elides with a particularlist justice
perspective in which communities (or nation-states)
with shared meanings and practices set the political
boundaries for moral arguments: there are no universal
moral principles of justice; only those relative to particu-
lar peoples and places [107]. Pogge [112] challenges this
by drawing on cosmopolitan arguments and the exis-
tence of human rights treaties. Cosmopolitanists (which
include Singer, Sen and Nussbaum) hold that ‘the ulti-
mate units of moral concern are individual people, not
states or other particular forms of human association’
[[113], p.470], a position similar to that of human secur-
ity. Held [113], another cosmopolitanist, further argues
that the existence of national or local decision-making
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having trans-local effects demands that ‘political institu-
tions need not only be locally based but must have a
wider scope and framework’ in order to respect the
inclusion and agency of ‘people who are significantly
affected by a political issue in the...transcommunity pub-
lic...sphere’ [[113], p.471]. Pogge weds this argument to
a claim that human rights constitute a universal moral
standard for all individuals. In doing so, he extends
Rawls’ basic justice theory to a global level, contending
that there are not simply ‘positive duties’ to assist (set-
ting aside debates as to the level to which such assis-
tance should rise), but moral obligations (negative
duties) to prevent harm. Pogge’s theory of relational jus-
tice is based on three lines of argument:
1. The radical inequalities observed between peoples
and nations today are partly an effect of a violent
history in which some gained at the expense of
others. While we individually cannot be held respon-
sible for the actions of our forebears in this ‘con-
quest,’ as moral persons we can be held accountable
for rectifying the vast disparities in initial conditions
that this history has created - a point at least nomin-
ally ceded to by high-income countries accepting
greater responsibility for climate change mitigation
based on their past excesses in emissions and eco-
nomic benefits derived from them.
2. Not only does procedural justice by itself fail to
account for these vast disparities in initial condi-
tions; it is impossible to conceive of these disparities
existing on the scale that they do without ‘an orga-
nized state of civilization’ [114] to uphold them.
3. There is evidence that economic institutions oper-
ating on an international scale (the ‘organized state
of civilization’) have been complicit in upholding
these injustices. Persons involved in upholding these
institutions are thus implicated in creating subse-
quent ill health, even though they may be half-way
around the world [115].
The moral implication is not only one of ‘rectification’
through strengthened human rights and more progres-
sive systems of global resource redistribution; but also
an obligation to change the way by which the rules of
economic governance are established in order to over-
come the historic and radical inequalities in initial
conditions.
Global Health Equity Concerns
If moral concern with health-compromising global
inequalities in resources and power begins with differ-
ences in peoples’ initial conditions, the distinctions
between equality of opportunity (procedural justice) and
equality of outcome (substantive justice) lessen. Equality
of opportunity, to be just, requires a disproportionate
provision of public goods and capability resources for
those whom history’s conquests, and today’s political
institutions, place in highly unequal initial conditions.
What becomes morally important is that all people have
‘equal realization of their health potential’ [[108],
p. 431], a sentiment essentially similar to the ‘right to
highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health.’ What remains at issue is the extent of moral (or
legal) obligation for amelioration of gross inequalities in
initial conditions that create ‘shortfall inequalities in
central health capabilities’ [[108], p. 431].
There is no answer to this question, apart from the
imperative to seek one. In this quest, norms of proce-
dural justice become important. Boggio [116], in an
argument for why international organizations and those
within them have an ethical obligation to act to redress
systematic health inequalities, addresses how such policy
decisions can be made in a just manner. He identifies
three basic principles for an ‘ethically-informed delibera-
tive process’: publicity (transparency in process, a com-
prehensible rationale, and public argument and
evidence); relevance (trust in actors/institutions by reci-
pients, opportunity for wide participation, and interven-
tions based on recipients’ needs, values and aspirations);
and revisability (policies and programs can be chal-
lenged over time and improved, and individuals and
institutions can be held accountable to purpose). Several
of these conditions are similar to principles of good gov-
ernance widely held by governments and multilateral
organizations; that is, they can be considered as having
a broad normative base. Citing Daniels [117], Boggio
concludes that ‘ethics require “that there is a space for
deliberation in which reasonable people will disagree
about what is ethically required, either from a human
rights perspective or from other ethical conceptions"’
[116]. These procedural elements of ethical decision-
making, developed to apply to international institutions,
could apply equally to negotiations encountered in
global health diplomacy. These procedural elements,
however, do not and should not reduce to communitar-
ianism, in which the distributive norms and values of a
community or society are taken as absolute regardless of
their form, as long as there has been some deliberative
space for sharing of differing conceptions of the ‘good
life’ and ‘justice’ in their historic development. Such
relativism would deny the powerful and evidence-
informed justice arguments brought forward by Sen,
Nussbaum and Pogge, amongst others.
Conclusion
Global health is an increasingly prominent challenge to
foreign policy deliberations. How should this challenge
be framed with respect to improving global health
equity? The assumption underlying our examination of
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differing global health frames is that each one sets the
boundaries of problem-definition and intervention. In
that sense, each frame examined has limitations but all
have something strategic to offer (see Table 2).
With respect to the normative goal of improving glo-
bal health equity, a moral language is requisite for with-
out an ethical reference point considerations other than
national interests would likely prevail. But ethical argu-
ment in itself is insufficient as a basis for inserting
health more forcefully into foreign policy-making. Legal
language, setting forth the rules of national and global
governance, is also needed and remains best provided in
human rights covenants. Neither moral nor legal argu-
ment, in the absence of enforcement mechanisms, is
necessarily compelling as an economic or political ratio-
nale. Economically, both the global public goods and
development frames have some health utility in foreign
policy debates, but only if they are located beneath a
penumbra of ethical reasoning and legal obligation.
Otherwise the risk exists that these discourses will lead
to a triaging of foreign policy and global health aid deci-
sions that reflect the interests of wealthier nations. Poli-
tically, the security and trade frames are the most
potent but remain the most problematic. Both privilege
existing relations of political, military and economic
power over human rights, need or moral reasoning. The
securitization of health, even in its human rather than
national or economic rendering, remains premised in a
conception of the individual made capable to function
as a market actor; that is, it supports, rather than chal-
lenges, the social and economic assumptions that have
driven the past three decades of neoliberal globalization
[118].
While these differing policy frames offer multiple
rationales for positioning health higher in foreign policy
debates, what are the prospects that ‘global health diplo-
mats’ will succeed in capturing more of the foreign pol-
icy turf? In partial answer, Fidler offers three
conceptualizations to clarify global health’s recent rise in
foreign policy prominence: revolution, remediation and
regression [119]. Revolution argues that health’s increas-
ing role in foreign policy is transformative of the health-
foreign policy nexus. Health collapses the traditional
distinction between high and low politics and provides
new political space in which health is an overriding nor-
mative value and the ultimate goal of foreign policy.
This conceptualization is consistent with health as a
human right informed by moral/ethical reasoning.
Remediation asserts that health’s rise as a foreign policy
issue reflects the continued reality of the traditional
hierarchy of foreign policy functions. Health has become
another issue that needs to be addressed through tradi-
tional approaches. It does not transform thinking and is
not an overriding norm, and has risen as a foreign pol-
icy issue only because it threatens the high politics of
national security and material interest. This conceptuali-
zation resonates most with health as security and, to
some extent, health as development and as tradable
commodity. Regression views health’s integration into
foreign policy as an indicator that health problems are
getting worse. The increasing attention paid to health
across the functions of foreign policy signifies the failure
of public health efforts and a short-term need for some
improvement to simply ‘stay the course.’
Our desk review of existing policy and practice presented
in this article largely concurs with the remediation
Table 2 Summary of Key Arguments for Health in Foreign Policy
Security gives global health interventions greater traction across a
range of political classes than a rights-based argument alone. To
the extent that this strengthens a base of public health expansion,
securitisation of health may be a prerequisite to its eventual de-
securitization. But vigilance is needed to avoid national security
from trumping human security.
Trade can improve health through global market integration,
economic growth and positive health externalities. However,
present trade rules skew benefits towards more economically and
politically powerful countries; and evidence of negative health
externalities demands careful a priori assessments of trade treaties
for their health, development and human rights implications.
Development remains the invitation to global governance debates.
It provides a seat at the table. Risks inherent in its ‘investing in
health’ instrumentalism can be tempered by continuously
reminding decision makers to distinguish which one is the
objective (human development) and which one the tool (economic
growth).
Human rights, though weak in global enforcement, has advocacy
traction and legal potential within national boundaries. Such rights
do not resolve embedded tensions between the individual and the
collective, an issue to which human rights experts are now
attending
Global public goods provides a language by which economists of
one market persuasion can convince economists of another that
there is a sound rationale for a system of shared global financing
and regulation.
Moral/ethical reasoning is suggested as a necessary addendum to
the legalistic nature of human rights treaties. This need, in turn,
has created scholarly momentum to articulate more rigorous
argument for a global health ethic based on moral reasoning.
Competitors for such an ethic range from a liberal theory of
assistive duties based on ‘burdened societies’ in need, to
cosmopolitan arguments that emphasise minimum capabilities
needed for people to lead valued lives, to more recent arguments
for a new ethic of relational justice based on cosmopolitan and
human rights theories.
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conceptualization, consistent with the realist theory that
states act in their own interests in the international arena.
We are not alone in this assessment: others argue even
more strongly that ‘those global health issues for which a
direct link to core economic, foreign and security interests
is neither perceived nor proved will continue to be subju-
gated to other foreign policy priorities, regardless of the
strength of the scientific evidence mustered in their favour’
[[120], p.2]. This realpolitik conclusion has been argued for
health and aid, trade, national security and even treaty-
making, in which the revised IHRs and the FCTC as being
‘driven by state interests which can either facilitate or
undermine global health objectives’ [[120], p.5]. National
or mercantile self-interest, however, cannot entirely
account for foreign policy practices. The push for increased
maternal/child health aid, as we point out, reflects state
interests only weakly and over a very long-term time hori-
zon that is uncommon in the policy choices of short-man-
date governments. Increased multilateral aid partly
provided through global health initiatives further distances
development assistance from donors’ strategic interests.
There is a disjunction between policy and practice in many
instances, and inconsistencies within some of the policies
themselves; but there is also argument offered that cautions
against such lack of coherence. Coherence implies more
than coordination across different policy sectors but,
importantly, ‘substantive consistency and synergy among
different policies,’ including ‘consistency in framing how to
analyze and address global health problems’ [[121], p.14].
Our own analyses of coherence offered in this paper are
suggestive only at this time; foreign policy is dynamic (as
are changes in governments themselves), government
actions are not driven solely by their policy pronounce-
ments, and (importantly) policy statements or commen-
taries on health and foreign policy are still sufficiently new
that ex post analyses of changes in government’s foreign
policy practices are unlikely to demonstrate any firm trend.
Although largely concurring that global health has yet
to demonstrate any revolutionary shift in foreign policy
drivers, to the extent that the different discursive fram-
ings for global health create an enlarged space for
debate, an opening exists for global health equity to
become more central in foreign policy deliberations.
This challenges global health diplomats (whether gov-
ernment officials or representatives of civil society orga-
nizations) to strengthen the force of some of their
arguments, notably with respect to trade (its economist
limitations) but primarily in introducing human rights
and ethical norms into foreign policy debate. Ethical
arguments appear at present to be the most missing-in-
action; and human rights arguments, with a few excep-
tions, make little or no reference to their legal standing
or the international human rights framework (and
accountability systems) of which they are a part.
There remains some cause for optimism that global
health will retain and perhaps strengthen its prominence
in foreign policy. Spain, during its EU presidency in the
first half of 2010, focused on issues of global health
equity, coherence and knowledge [122]. The WHO con-
tinues to emphasize the health risks of unregulated glo-
bal financial markets while strengthening the knowledge
and practice base for global health diplomacy. The tran-
sition from the G8 to the G20 (while still fraught with
issues of economic elitism in global governance) incor-
porates some countries with stronger histories of rights-
based approaches to health. And, despite the UN Gen-
eral Assembly in December 2009 focusing only on
emerging infectious diseases and the critical shortage of
health workers in many countries as health and foreign
policy priorities [123], the background report to this
resolution [124] was more comprehensive in scoping the
global health foreign policy issues than were many of
the government documents and commentaries examined
in our own review.
Global health may thus be well-positioned to influence
how globalization re-emerges from its present economic
crisis; but how effectively it accomplishes this will partly
be determined by the capacities and skills of its health
diplomats, and the policy framing arguments they
choose to emphasize or critique.
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